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When comparing and evaluating rival scientific theories, 
decisions as to which theory best explains the available data are 
often made in light of features exemplified by (or at least believed 
to be exemplified by) one or more of the theories in question. 
Among these "theoretical virtues" are simplicity, predictive 
accuracy, internal consistency, fecundity, and the ability to solve 
external, conceptual problems. Currently, in the debate over life's 
origin, it appears that the precise role and relative importance of 
certain theoretical virtues has not yet been established. For 
example, if the editors of Paleobiology or The Skeptical Inquirer 
were to receive a manuscript arguing for a special creationist or 
Lamarckian view of the origin and purpose of the platypus' oddly-
shaped bill, it is not likely that they would, at least prima facie, 
give it much consideration for publication. Similarly, it is unlikely 
that those at the San Diego based Institute for Creation Research 
would be convinced by, e.g., Douglas Futuyma's case for human 
evolution.1 Presumably, the representatives of these and other 
groups come to their respective conclusions not because they are 
largely ignorant of the available empirical data, but rather because 
they disagree about what counts as a theoretical virtue in the first 
place, and because they are at odds regarding how a given virtue 
ought to factor into one's evaluation of the available data. 
Lamentably, despite 150 years of conflict over when and how life 
began, in-depth treatments of theoretical virtues and their role in 
the debate over l ife 's origin are vir tually non-ex is ten t . 2 
Nonetheless, when such discussions do appear in print, the virtues 
most commonly treated are testability, simplicity, and fecundity-
i.e., fruitfulness for further research.3 
*1 would like to thank Garry DeWeese, Steven C. Meyer, Nathan Hitchcock, and the 
two anonymous reviewers at Auslegung for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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Testability 
Of the three virtues mentioned above, the one most heavily 
favored in the current literature, especially among naturalistic 
evolutionists who tend to see a rigid line of demarcation between 
science and non-science, with creationism falling to the side of 
non-science, is that of testability. However, an emphasis on the 
importance of testability to scientific theories is not limited to 
naturalistic evolutionists with demarcationist sympathies. Rather, 
the list of those who emphasize the importance of testability 
includes even many so-called "young earth" creationists who 
believe that life on earth began a few thousand years ago as a 
result of the acts of an all-powerful and loving Creator, and who 
consider the fossil record to be the result of relatively recent global 
flood as described in the biblical book of Genesis. While they 
heartily disagree with evolutionists as to how life began, young 
earth creationists such as Henry Morris, 4 and Duane Gish, 5 concur 
with, e.g., Niles Eldredge that testability lies at the very heart of 
scientific enterprise, and that it is the "cardinal virtue" of science 
itself.6 Whether or not they are correct in this assessment, however, 
remains to be seen. 
The fundamental idea behind testability is that a scientific 
theory must be in principle capable of being falsified. However, 
this notion can be both elucidated and applied in several different 
ways. The more philosophically minded person might explain 
testability in scientific theories by claiming that the proposition(s) 
essential to a given theory should only make synthetic statements 
whose truth-values can be known a posteriori. In other words, the 
primary evidence for a scientific theory must come from entities 
and phenomena whose existence was discovered (or at least 
posited) rather than known implicitly or apart from the senses. A 
more commonly treated aspect of testability is that of predictive 
accuracy, where a predicted outcome is either directly observable 
or otherwise empirically verifiable. Here, the observation of a 
predicted outcome is taken to count in favor of a theory, while 
failure to make such an observation counts against it. Presumably, 
the more frequently a scientist can accurately predict future 
phenomena on the basis of a given theory, the more likely the theory 
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is to be true, or at least empirically adequate. Conversely, a theory's 
reliability and/or explanatory power diminishes with each false or 
otherwise inaccurate prediction. 
Another aspect of testability centers on the fact that certain 
phenomena naturally occur at regular intervals. Many physical or 
astronomical theories are testable (at least in part) if they make 
defeasible claims about naturally recurring phenomena such as 
red shift or pulsar emissions. Similarly, testability in biological 
and chemical theories often entails that the conditions under which 
a state of affairs originally obtained be repeatable under controlled 
conditions, whether by the scientist who made the initial discovery, 
or by other scientists in the field. Although this latter aspect of 
testability may not be the one most germane to the issue of life's 
origin, there are circumstances in which it could, and, in fact, does 
come into play. Some naturalistic evolutionists, for example, argue 
that intelligent design theories are inherently untestable because 
they do not, or perhaps cannot, refer to phenomena that can be 
reproduced under controlled conditions. 7 However, scientists 
operating under an intelligent design framework could make their 
theory testable in this way if, for example, they claim to have 
discovered the genetic limits of viability and adaptability in certain 
organisms and invite evolutionary biologists to test their results. 8 
However, despite its relevance to science and scientific 
theories, some philosophers of science have pointed out difficulties 
in both defining and applying the criterion of testability. For one 
thing, the fact that one or more scientific theories are testable can 
in and of itself say very little about whether or not a particular 
theory should be preferred over any other. Two or more rival 
theor ies (e .g . , or thodox neo-Darwinism and punc tua ted 
equilibrium) may both be testable, but they may also explain the 
relevant data in very different ways, and an appeal to the testability 
criterion alone will furnish no help in deciding between the two. 
A second, more important difficulty in applying the testability 
criterion is that scientific theories are usually (if not always) tested 
against a set of background assumptions which include ideas about 
how to interpret the scientific data and what one would or would 
not expect to find if a given theory were true. As Moreland notes, 
when a predicted outcome fails to occur, something has been 
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falsified. However , because phi losophica l and other 
presuppositions are also involved in the performing and evaluation 
of scientific experiments, it is often difficult to say precisely what 
that something is. 9 Because of this, a theory that is prima facie 
falsified because of its failure to accurately predict the obtaining 
of a certain state of affairs could potentially be saved by re-thinking 
and modifying any of a number of background assumptions. This 
makes the falsification of certain broad-level scientific theories-
including theories of life's origin- an extremely difficult task. 
At the risk of being overly brief, the above considerations seem 
to indicate that in regard to theory adjudication, testability plays 
two main roles. First, examining a theory with respect to whether 
or not it can be tested at all helps us separate insightful and/or 
potentially viable theories from trivial, non-viable ones. Second, 
considering the means and methods by which a given theory may 
be tested helps us differentiate between theories that are primarily 
scientific and those that are primarily philosophical or religious. 
However, beyond these two roles, (and contrary to current 
methodology), testability is not the kind of virtue that is among 
the most applicable in deciding between two or more well-
formulated, rival theory-types. In other words, although a specific 
evolutionary or intelligent design theory of life's origin might be 
rejected on the grounds that it is not readily testable, testability is 
not the kind of virtue that could help us decide on the whole between 
naturalistic evolution and intelligent design. In light of the above 
considerations, one cannot help but wonder why many philosophers 
and scientists alike have emphasized this virtue so strongly; often 
to the neglect of others, such as simplicity. 
Simplicity 
Though scientists and philosophers often maintain that 
simplicity is indicative of (if not essential to) a good scientific 
theory, it is also fairly common knowledge that defining and 
applying the concept of simplicity is not at all a simple task. Some, 
e.g., Kitcher, take simplicity to be akin to the unification of one's 
methods. That is, a simple theory will successfully solve problems 
by consistently invoking the same pattern of reasoning. 1 0 However, 
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the notion of simplicity can also apply to the type and/or number 
of causal mechanisms posi ted or required by a theory. 
Philosophical naturalists and those in search of a "Grand Unified 
Theory of Everything" are two examples of this. Finally, simplicity 
could be taken to refer to the number and type of background 
assumptions upon which a theory is based. That is, one theory 
could be favored over another if it is based upon well-understood 
and widely believed assumptions as opposed to ill-defined, tenuous 
ones. 
When evaluating theories of life's origin, a difficulty that arises 
from having to deal with several different notions of simplicity is 
that competing theories may be simple in different ways. For 
example, whereas naturalistic evolutionary theories postulate 
multiple causal entities necessary for the existence of life in its 
current form (e.g., mutation, natural selection, differential 
reproduction, environmental changes), intelligent design theories 
postulate only one necessary causal entity: God. On the other 
hand, in examining specific issues (e.g., comparative morphology), 
intelligent design theories may be based on more numerous and 
less widely agreed upon assumptions (e.g., that God would replicate 
the pentadactyl bone structure in animals as widely diverse as 
whales and humans because it is a good design which works well 
in several different applications). In a case like this, it is unclear 
which aspect of the simplicity criterion should take precedence. 
It seems, then, that in regard to theory adjudication in general, 
the criterion of simplicity is perhaps best applied on a case-by-
case basis. Furthermore, in the debate over life's origin, it seems 
that the simplicity criterion is most useful in weeding out specific 
versions of a theory, and not broad theory-types. Accomplishing 
this latter task requires the additional work of considering, among 
other things, the ways in which a theory or theory-type may be 
more or less fruitful than its rivals. Moreover, we must also seek 
to determine whether or not there are additional virtues besides 
testability, simplicity, and fecundity that may be even more 
applicable in deciding between rival theories of life's origin. But 
first, we shall examine the virtue of fecundity. 
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Fecundity 
It is commonplace to encounter a philosopher or scientist 
claiming that a good scientific theory will be fruitful, and that the 
best scientific theory will often (if not always) be the most fruitful 
one. However, just as simplicity is a complex and often multi-
faceted issue, so also is the issue of fecundity. One of the oldest 
and best-known aspects of fecundity is sometimes referred to as 
the consilience of inductions, or more simply as the virtue of 
consilience. Here, a fruitful theory is one that is supported by 
several different lines of evidence; often also accounting for data 
that is difficult or impossible for other theories to accommodate. 
Depending on the nature of the theory, this data may originate 
from either within or outside of the sciences. We might properly 
call this feature of a theory its "evidentially-based" fruitfulness. 
But there are other ways in which a theory may be fruitful. 
For one thing, a theory may also be pragmatically or technologically 
fruitful. A theory is fruitful in this sense if it leads to other scientific 
discoveries or to further technological advances. Medical testing 
on animals is but one example of this. For some evolutionists, 
that experimental drugs and medical procedures can be successfully 
tested on e.g., rats, monkeys, and pigs before prescribing them for 
human use is an indication of our common descent. Yet another 
way in which a theory may be considered fruitful is if it is 
psychologically or methodologically fruitful; that is, if it stimulates 
new lines of research and greater intellectual rigor among 
scientists. 1 1 
Nonetheless, as is the case with testability and simplicity, how 
one ought to go about deciding which of a given number of theories 
is the most fruitful is a difficult question. For just as a scientific 
theory may be simple in ways different from its rivals, a scientific 
theory may also be fruitful in ways different from its rivals. One 
theory may enjoy a broader evidential foundation, but lead to little 
if any further research. A rival theory may have less broadly based 
evidence, but may lead to great technological advances or spur on 
more promising theoretical research. 
The theory-dependent nature of evidence creates a further 
difficulty. On one hand, the punctuated equilibrium theory put 
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forth by Eldredge and Gould may be more evidentially fruitful 
than neo-Darwinism in explaining gaps in the fossil record. Here, 
what is an anomaly for one theory is accounted for by the other. 
On the other hand, orthodox neo-Darwinism may make better use 
of known evolutionary mechanisms such as natural selection, 
mutation, and adaptation than its saltationist counterpart. Similarly, 
with regard to technological or pragmatic fruitfulness, based on 
the assumption that a particular biological phenomenon (e.g., 
information storage and duplication in the cell) is not mere 
happenstance but is actually an instance of good design, intelligent 
design theories may lead to greater technological advances, and 
may even lead to greater discoveries in genetics and microbiology 
than their naturalistic evolutionist rivals. But when deciding 
between rival theories, which type of fruitfulness should we favor 
most heavily? And how should we weigh the value of a theory's 
simplicity in relation to that of its fecundity or falsifiability, or in 
relation to the fruitfulness, simplicity, or falsifiability of its rivals? 
The correct answers, if they exist, are not clear; nor, as we shall 
see, is it clear (or even likely) that a virtue like fecundity (or 
testability, or simplicity) ought to factor in more heavily than, say, 
internal consistency or solving external conceptual problems. 
An Evaluation of the Above Virtues 
If nothing else, when one considers even a few of the many 
background issues involved in the debate over life's origin, it soon 
becomes clear that deciding between rival theories is not simply a 
matter of examining the empirical, scientific data. Moreover, in 
light of the aforementioned considerations, it seems that despite 
their importance to adjudicating between rival scientific theories 
in general, due to the level of generality at which theories of life's 
origin operate and the breadth of data they attempt to explain, the 
virtues favored by the currently dominant approach do not offer 
much help when it comes to evaluating such broad-level, rival 
theories of life's origin as naturalistic evolution and intelligent 
design. Put differently, the fact that the last 150 or so years of 
operating under our current methodology has given us no indication 
that we've come any closer to ending the discussion, along with 
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the difficulties inherent in defining and applying the virtues of 
simplicity, fecundity, and falsifiability, seems to yield the 
conclusion that, for whatever their merits, problems originating 
from these considerations lend but modest weight in helping us 
evaluate the overall plausibility of naturalistic evolution vis-ä-vis 
that of intelligent design. But can any other theoretical virtue(s) 
offer more help? On one hand, the absence of certain virtues, 
especially internal, logical consistency, seems to doom a theory 
from the start. In other words, a theory that is either incoherent or 
inherently self-contradictory is unbelievable regardless of any 
empirical evidence. But more importantly, assuming that at least 
some theories of design and descent are both internally consistent 
and genuinely scientific, it seems that one of the most promising 
areas for adjudicating between rival theories of life's origin lies in 
evaluating their ability to solve external conceptual problems; that 
is, problems originating outside the sciences that may pose 
difficulties for a given scientific theory. An example of a potential 
external conceptual problem for naturalistic evolution lies in the 
area of epistemology- the study or theory of knowledge . 
Specifically, we commonly think that part of our rationality as 
humans lies in the fact that we are able to weigh evidence and 
come to justified conclusions on the basis of this evidence. 
However, if the truth of naturalistic evolution entails that all human 
action is merely the product of chance, heredity, and our 
environment, then it seems that our decision-making skills are at 
the mercy of these external factors. If so, then it seems plausible, 
reliabilist accounts of justification not withstanding, that none of 
our beliefs are justified, including the belief that naturalistic 
evolution is true. J.P. Moreland has argued in detail that external 
conceptual problems ought to play a more prominent role in 
adjudicating between scientific theories than is currently 
practiced, 1 2 and some evolutionists have noted the inter-relatedness 
between our scientific and philosophical beliefs. 1 3 In a similar 
vein, the remainder of this essay will examine ways in which certain 
external, conceptual problems have been brought to bear 
specifically on theories of life's origin and some consequences 
that seem to follow for evaluating and justifying beliefs regarding 
these theories. 
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External Conceptual Problems and the Origin of Life Debate 
Despite what appears to be an increasing support for scientific 
pluralism over against a unificationist aim of science, 1 4 it seems 
that when philosophers of science think and write about issues of 
methodology, they primarily have in mind a methodology fit for 
certain areas of science (e.g., atomic theory in physics and 
pathology in biology) whose conclusions generally don't have 
much relevance for other, non-empirical disciplines. For example, 
whether or not the Copenhagen school is correct about quantum 
mechanics doesn't seem to have a direct bearing on whether or 
not humankind is unique among animals or is, with all life, merely 
the result of some cosmic accident. Likewise, the truth of oxygen 
chemistry has implications neither for the morality of embryonic 
stem cell research, nor for the historical reliability, or lack thereof, 
of the opening chapters of Genesis. On the other hand, if all life 
on earth is of common descent and has resulted entirely because 
of chance, natural selection, and mutation, this could have 
tremendous and far-reaching implications for other disciplines, 
especially religion and the humanities. But what about the 
contrary? Might it not also be the case that considerations from 
other disciplines can and should play an important part in evaluating 
scientific theories of life's origin? That the following arguments, 
among others, exist at all seems to indicate so. 
Near the end of his work, The Blind Watchmaker, Richard 
Dawkins surveys and briefly critiques what he considers to be the 
major alternatives to neo-Darwinian evolution (e.g., Lamarckism, 
neutralism, and special creation). He concludes the chapter by 
putting forth a conceptual argument for Neo-Darwinian evolution 
to the effect that Darwinism is the only known theory that is in 
principle capable of explaining such aspects of life as adaptive 
complexity and the appearance of design. His argument centers 
on the assumption that we cannot legitimately explain the 
complexity of certain aspects of the universe by invoking causal 
mechanisms, (e.g., God), that are themselves complex. For 
Dawkins, to do so would be to postulate the existence of the very 
thing we're trying to explain; namely, order and complexity in the 
universe. In short, Dawkins seems to maintain that the only way 
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to explain the order and complexity of life on earth without 
assuming a priori the existence of complex entities is via some 
sort of Darwinian evolution. Thus, even if we had no empirical 
evidence for neo-Darwinism, we still ought to embrace it for purely 
philosophical reasons. 1 5 
In addition to the above conceptual argument which could 
potentially lend considerable extra-scientific support for 
Darwinism, there are conceptual arguments against Darwinian 
evolution which should be considered as well. If Hull is correct, 
then one of the earliest of these arguments originated with John 
Stuart Mill. Hull contends that one reason Mill ultimately rejected 
Darwinian evolution is that Mill took statements about species to 
be laws of nature. If species evolve, it follows that laws of nature 
are evolving. And if laws of nature can evolve, then we can never 
know anything about the physical universe, because not even the 
physical laws themselves are constant. 1 6 
Taking a somewhat different approach, during the middle of 
the last century, Richard Taylor argued that if, as naturalistic 
evolutionists claim, our sensory and rational faculties have arisen 
apart from the work of one or more supernatural beings, then we 
are no more justified in believing the deliverances of our reason 
and our senses any more than we are justified in believing, for 
example, that a pile of white rocks scattered on a hillside by wind 
and erosion and resembling the words, "THE BRITISH 
RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES" gives us reason to 
think we are in Wales. 1 7 A recent, more robust formulation of this 
type of argument has been put forth by Alvin Plantinga.1 8 Plantinga 
contends that if our cognitive faculties have originated as Dawkins 
and others believe, then the objective conditional probability of 
their being reliable is either low, such that we are unjustified in 
believing such things as the truth of naturalistic evolution, or it is 
such that we at least should be agnostic with respect to it. Either 
way, if Plantinga is right, then evolutionary naturalism is self-
defeating and cannot be rationally believed or accepted. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many remain unconvinced that the 
above conceptual arguments warrant their conclusions. In fact, a 
book-length collection of essays devoted solely to Plantinga's 
evolutionary argument against naturalism has recently appeared 
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in print. 1 9 For our purposes, however, it is irrelevant whether or 
not any of these arguments are sound. Rather, the important 
consideration here is that each of these arguments could potentially 
establish either neo-Darwinism or intelligent design as the most 
justified theory of life's origin independently of any empirical 
evidence whatsoever. As mentioned earlier, if Plantinga's argument 
(or even Taylor's argument, for that matter) is sound, then the truth 
of naturalistic evolution would be that none of our beliefs are 
justified, including the belief that naturalistic evolution is true. If 
this is the case, then due to the nature of our belief-producing 
mechanisms themselves, no amount of empirical evidence in favor 
of naturalistic evolution could bring it about that an individual is 
warranted in believing naturalistic evolution to be true. Conversely, 
there seems to be neither any empirical data, nor any consideration 
based solely thereon, that could have an equally drastic impact on 
the epistemic status of one's beliefs about life's origin, especially 
in light of such factors as underdetermination and the previously 
noted difficulties inherent in defining and applying such virtues 
as simplicity and testability. But if this is the case, then why think 
that the current methodology, which gives seemingly unqualified 
pride of place to empirical data and the theoretical virtues discussed 
above, provides us with an adequate framework for adjudicating 
between competing theories of life's origin? Perhaps we should 
seek instead to embrace a more holistically oriented philosophy of 
science; one that weighs a theory's merits at least partially on its 
ability to solve external, philosophical problems such as the ones 
mentioned above. 2 0 Apart from any forthcoming demonstration 
that, e.g., the available empirical data or a theory's ability to make 
accurate predictions could have the same "make or break" potential 
for or against a particular theory of origins, this seems to be a 
more promising view. 
Finally, although a detailed discussion is not feasible here, it 
should be noted that, in addition to the epis temological 
considerations mentioned above, problems in other areas of 
philosophy, including ethics, the philosophy of religion, and the 
philosophy of mind may also constitute external, conceptual 
problems for a particular theory of life's origin. Such problems 
may arise based on either the presuppositions upon which a given 
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theory is based, or a theory's philosophical implications. An 
example of the latter may include the problem of locating 
consciousness and the first-person perspective in a materialist 
ontology. Specifically, it seems that a complete, naturalistic 
evolutionary theory of life's origin should in principle be able to 
explain, among other things, the origin and nature of human 
consciousness and the first-person perspective. Currently however, 
there appears to be nothing even remotely resembling a consensus 
as to how, exactly, this might be done. If, over time, these 
phenomena continue to pose a persistent and recalcitrant problem 
for the materialist ontology on which naturalistic evolution rests, 
then it seems that short of embracing an eliminativist view of the 
mental, at some point our failure to come up with an adequate 
explanation for consciousness and the first-person perspective 
would provide at least modest grounds for doubting the adequacy 
of naturalistic evolution as an all-encompassing account of the 
origin of life and all its putative features. Conversely, if some 
future naturalistic theory of consciousness were to revolutionize 
and dominate the philosophy of mind the way that Darwinism 
currently dominates the sciences, then the explanatory adequacy 
of naturalistic evolution will be further substantiated. As for an 
example of an external conceptual problem which might undermine 
a scientific theory's philosophical foundations, William Lane Craig 
has recently argued that a robust defense of the kalam cosmological 
argument provides good reason to believe that a transcendent, 
personal Creator was the cause of the beginning of the universe. 2 1 
If Craig's version of the kalam argument is sound, then all 
naturalistic versions of Darwinian evolution would thus be rendered 
false. Clearly, such an argument would constitute an intractable 
external, conceptual problem for naturalistic evolution. Whether 
Craig is correct on this matter is, of course, hotly debated, but 
more importantly, despite these and other relevant considerations, 
discussions of the external conceptual problems that may arise for 
a given theory of life's origin are nowhere near commonplace 
within the scientific community, or the intellectual community at 
large. However, if what I have said here is even approximately 
correct, then any robust defense of a theory of life's origin ought 
to take these issues into account, especially in light of the potential 
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for certain external conceptual problems to undermine completely 
one's warrant for holding a particular view. 
Conclusion 
Our over-arching concern in this essay has been whether or 
not the currently dominant approach to theory adjudication in the 
philosophy of science is adequate for deciding between rival 
theories of life's origin. For the reasons mentioned above, we 
have concluded that it is not. Rather, instead of treating the issue 
of life's origin as a largely scientific question that should be 
answered primarily (if not solely) on the basis of empirical 
evidence, we have seen that it involves, among other things, deeply 
philosophical considerations as well; considerations which are 
often logically prior to and in some ways more important than an 
examination of the empirical data. Moreover, since competing 
theories of human origins have such profound impacts on other 
areas of thought, and since philosophical and theological concerns 
often tacitly, if not overtly, factor into the debate, then there is no 
good reason why we should not be forthright about letting relevant 
considerations from disciplines outside of science have their say 
on the matter when appropriate. 
Furthermore, in light of what has been said above, it seems 
that there exist a number of possible scenarios which, given the 
current intellectual climate, would be epistemically irresponsible 
if they were to occur, but in fact turn out to be more justified than 
they initially appear. For one thing, an intelligent design theorist 
who rejects Dawkins's conceptual argument for Darwinian 
evolution while accepting one or more of the arguments put forth 
by Mill, Taylor, and Plantinga against naturalistic evolution seems 
at least to some degree warranted in holding her view even if there 
existed seemingly overwhelming empirical support for naturalistic 
evolution. 2 2 Conversely, one who is compelled by Dawkins' 
conceptual argument for Darwinism could justifiably embrace 
some forms of Darwinism even if the empirical evidence in its 
favor somehow turned out to be very weak. 
Moreover, it also seems that if there were good philosophical 
reasons to support an intelligent design view of life's origin (e.g., 
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if one or more of the arguments mentioned above were sound), 
then a scientist or group of scientists who embraced such a view 
could legitimately carry out their scientific research based on these 
assumptions. In other words, just as most scientists currently carry 
out research under the assumption that life in its current form is 
the result of purely natural processes, there seems in principle no 
reason why scientists could not also legitimately do research under 
the assumption that a powerful intelligence is ultimately behind 
life as we know it. Empirical evidence does, of course, play an 
important part in confirming or disconfirming specific versions of 
these differing theories, but only after they have been articulated 
with a sufficient degree of specificity. However, when it comes to 
evaluating the overall framework under which scientific research 
is done, the legitimacy and viability of a given research program 
should also be based on, among other things, how well its 
conclusions and implications deal with problems originating from 
outside the sciences. 
If the above contentions are correct, perhaps the most important 
question we could then ask is, how might this more holistic 
approach affect our view of life's origin, and how might we come 
to weigh evidence differently? What might we conclude about 
the fossil record, or about comparative morphology, or about our 
current approach to taxonomy? Perhaps if we allow ourselves to 
be open to these kinds of questions, then data that is commonly 
thought to be strong evidence in favor of naturalistic evolution 
will, upon closer inspection, be discovered to be neutral to or even 
damaging to it. Of course, the evidence for common descent and 
evolutionary change by purely natural means may remain as strong 
as advocates of naturalistic evolution say it is, and under the 
approach being advocated here, it may in fact become even more 
persuasive. Regardless, it seems clear that the currently popular 
way of evaluating theories of life's origin is too narrowly construed 
and does not give proper weight to other areas relevant to the 
debate. Similarly, it also seems clear that in evaluating such 
theories there is a legitimate and important place for considerations 
originating outside the sciences. If we genuinely desire truth (or 
at least warranted belief) on this issue, then we should be interested 
in evaluating theories of life's origin not only by their ability to 
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accommodate the fossil data in the Burgess shale, but also by 
whether or not they can adequately account for such things as the 
contours of our mental life, our ability to communicate via written 
and spoken language, and the nearly ubiquitous belief in life after 
death. A more holistic approach to evaluating theories of life's 
origin may also better enable us to understand and appreciate the 
ways in which scientific discoveries influence our religious and 
philosophical beliefs, and vice-versa. Such an approach may even 
lead to more fruitful scientific research than the current paradigm. 
More importantly, if we are open and honest with ourselves and 
with all the available evidence, whether empirical or otherwise, 
this broader approach may better enable us to arrive at informed, 
reasonable beliefs about our existence and place in the universe. 
Notes 
1 See Douglas Futuyma, Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 98-113. 
2 The best treatment that I have seen thus far on this issue is Kitcher 
1982, pp. 30-54. 
3 See, e.g., Kitcher 1982, pp. 30-48; Root-Bernstein 1984, pp. 65-
68; Gish 1985, p. 12; Morris 1985, pp. 4,9; Huse 1986, p. 1 and Eldredge 
2000, pp. 20-22. For a different approach that is more akin to the position 
we will be taking here, see J.P. Moreland, "Conceptual Issues, Science, 
and the Scientific Status of Design and Descent" Perspectives on Science 
and the Christian Faith 46:2 2-13). 
4 Henry Morris, Scientific Creationism (El Cajon, CA: Master Books, 
1985), 4. 
5 Duane T. Gish, "Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence" 
in But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/ 
Evolution Controversy ed. Michael Ruse (Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1996), 267. 
6 Niles Eldredge, The Triumph of Evolution and the Failure of 
Creationism (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2000), 78. 
7 See, e.g., Eldredge 2000, p.91, and Pennock 1999, pp. 194-196. 
8 Some have in fact already done this. See, e.g., Lane Lester and 
Raymond G Bolin, The Natural Limits to Biological Change, 2d. ed. 
(Dallas: Probe Books, 1989). 
9 J.P. Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Books, 1989), 33. For a more detailed discussion of the 
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importance of auxiliary assumptions and the difficulties they pose for 
falsifying a theory, see Hempel 1966, pp. 22-25. 
1 0 Phillip Kitcher, Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982), 47. See also Kitcher 1989, p. 
432. 
" Some evolutionists have faulted intelligent design-based theories 
for failing to be fruitful in this way (see, e.g., Root-Bernstein, Robert. 
"On Defining a Scientific Theory: Creationism Considered" in Science 
and Creationism ed. Ashley Montagu (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984) 71). For a particularly cogent reply by an intelligent design 
theorist, see Ratzsch 2001, pp. 122-123). 
1 2 See J.P. Moreland, "Conceptual Issues, Science, and the Scientific 
Status of Design and Descent" Perspectives on Science and the Christian 
Faith 45:1 (March, 1994), 2-13. 
1 3 Hull 1989, p. 65 is particularly relevant. He writes, "Too often the 
content of scientific theories and our beliefs about the nature of science 
are treated as if they change in relative independence of each other, when 
in actual fact their development is closely interlaced. Just as our 
methodological beliefs influence the content of scientific theories, the 
content of these theories influences what we take to be proper method." 
See also John Hodge, ""Knowing about Evolution: Darwin and His Theory 
of Natural Selection" in Richard Creath and Jane Maienschein (eds.), 
Biology and Epistemology, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27-47. 
1 4 See, e.g., Longino, 2000. 
1 5 Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, 287-317. 
1 6 David Hull, ""Why Did Darwin Fail? The Role of John Stuart 
Mill" in Biology and Epistemology, eds. Richard Creath and Jane 
Maienschein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 48-63, 
58. 
1 7 Taylor 1963, pp. 96-102. 
1 8 Alvin Plantinga, "An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" 
in Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief 
eds. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Carol J. White. (Chicago: Open Court, 
1993) 35-66. 
1 9 James K. Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's 
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). 
2 0 Although I have thus far emphasized the importance of considering 
external, conceptual problems in adjudicating the origin of life debate, 
several other virtues that I have not examined should be considered as 
well; not the least of which is a theory's aesthetic properties. 
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Unfortunately, although several thought-provoking works on beauty and 
theory adjudication have appeared as of late, e.g., James W. McAllister, 
Beauty and Revolution in Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), considerations of length and my own lack of proficiency on 
the subject have prevented me from treating these subjects. 
2 1 See William Lane Craig, "Design and the Cosmological Argument" 
in William Dembski, ed., Mere Creation: Science, Faith, and Intelligent 
Design (Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998) 352-359. See 
also William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big 
Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
2 2 Of course, if the scientific evidence largely indicates a biohistory 
of common descent and gradual change due to natural selection and 
mutation, then the person in question should probably hold to some form 
of theistic evolution or what Ratzsch calls, "quantum intervention" 
(Ratzsch 2001, pp. 31-33). Each of these views, though considerably 
different from the type of intelligent design theory put forth by Johnson, 
Dembski, Moreland, Meyer, and others, nonetheless have in common 
the idea that certain aspects of the universe, including the existence of 
various biological entities and phenomena, are the result of the intentional 
acts of an intelligent being or beings. For further discussion, see Ratzsch 
1996, pp. 186-88. 
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